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Abstract
We perform the analysis of probabilistic assumptions of Bell’s ap-
proach. We emphasize that J. Bell wrote about probability without
to specify the concrete axiomatics of probability theory. The careful
analysis demonstrated that (surprisingly) J. Bell did not apply the
classical probability model (Kolmogorov) to describe “classical phys-
ical framework.” In fact, he created his own probabilistic model and
compared it with the quantum one. The crucial point is that J. Bell
did not pay attention to conditional probabilities. We show that con-
ditional probability in his model cannot be defined by classical Bayes’
formula. We also use the approach based on Bell-type inequalities
in the conventional probabilistic approach, Kolmogorov model. We
prove an analog of Wigner’s inequality for conditional probabilities
and by using this inequality show that predictions of the conventional
and quantum probability models disagree already in the case of non-
composite systems (even in the two dimensional case!).
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Bell’s inequality has definitely beaten all records in the history of physics
on the number of possible interpretations, misunderstandings, mysteries and
revolutionary consequences. As the organizer of a series of international
conferences on foundations of quantum theory, see e.g. [1]–[5] , I was really
disappointed by stormy debates on Bell’s inequality. There is no any problem
in quantum foundations which can be compared with Bell’s inequality by
intensiveness of discussions and reactions to opponent’s views.
I asked myself many times: “What is so special in Bell’s inequality?” I
concluded that the main problem was that from the very beginning J. Bell
formulated precisely the aim of his investigation, namely, to prove nonlocality
of QM.1. But he did not determine precisely a mathematical model which he
used to formalize the problem. J. Bell did not define precisely the probabilis-
tic rules of the game in the form of the axiomatic probability model which
he planed to apply to investigation of the EPR-Bohm experiment. There-
fore different people presented their own views on mathematical rules of the
Bell-game and, consequently, they come to totally different conclusions.
J. Bell wrote about probability [6] without to specify the concrete ax-
iomatics of probability theory. Unfortunately, after numerous conversations
with outstanding physicists I have the impression that there is a rather com-
mon opinion that there is no need in using of an axiomatic model for proba-
bility. Typically such a viewpoint is motivated by by considering probability
as “physically well defined quantity.” Therefore one need not take care of
probabilistic formalism. I totally disagree with such a viewpoint. In the
same way one could say that physicist need not take care of a mathematical
model of space. Fortunately, nobody would say this now days. Everybody
understood that it is one thing to work in the continuous real space (as peo-
ple do in classical physics) and totally different thing to work in discrete or
p-adic space . Nobody would say that physicist need not take care of geome-
try. Suppose that people would try to work in physics without to determine
mathematical model of space and geometry on it. It is clear that such an
activity would induce debates and misunderstandings and variety of para-
doxes. I think that the similar thing happened with Bell’s inequality (but
with probability, instead of space).
Nevertheless, during last 40 years people have been trying to proceed
1People who were very close to J. Bell explained me that he was “nonlocal realist” and
the main aim his investigations was to find arguments supporting the Bohmian model of
QM.
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with Bell’s inequalities without to describe precisely the probabilistic model.
Moreover, there is a rather common opinion that it is possible to work only
with frequencies and hence there is no need in the mathematical description
of a corresponding probability model.
In this paper we describe precisely the Bellian probabilistic model which
was really used in the EPR-Bell framework. It may be surprising that in fact
J. Bell did not apply the classical probabilistic model, the Kolmogorovian
model [7] (which was used in the classical statistical mechanics). The Bel-
lian classical probabilistic model, see section 1.1, differs crucially from the
conventional Kolmogorovian model of probability. So J. Bell did not com-
pare quantum model (based on the Hilbert space calculus of probabilities)
with the conventional Kolmogorovian model, but he created (without to pay
attention to this) his own “classical probability model and compared the lat-
ter with quantum mechanics. But the the classical statistical mechanics is
described by the Kolmogorov model, and not by Bellian model. Therefore
already on the ‘classical level” J. Bell lost direct connection with classical
physics. He used a rather unusual “classical probability model and it is not
so strange that he came to rather unusual explanation of difference between
it and quantum mechanics.
The crucial point is that J. Bell did not pay attention to conditional prob-
abilities. But in any well established probability model conditional probabil-
ities should be defined, cf. [8], [9]. In the Kolmogorov model they are defined
by the Bayes’ formula, in the quantum model by von Neumann projection
postulate. But in the Bellian “classical probability model” there is no con-
ditional probabilities! The only thing that evident from Bell’s works is that
conditional probability in his model cannot be defined by Bayes’ formula. We
show this in the present note. We also use the approach based on Bell-type
inequalities in the conventional probabilistic approach, Kolmogorov model.
We prove an analog of Wigner’s inequality [10] (a Bell-type inequality) for
conditional probabilities and by using this inequality show that predictions
of the conventional and quantum probability models disagree already in the
case of noncomposite systems(even in the two dimensional case!).
3
1 Measure-theoretical derivation of Bell’s in-
equality
1.1 Bellian probability model
Let us consider a probabilistic model which based on the measure-theoretic
approach (as the original Kolmogorov probability model), but there is no
such a notion as conditional probability. In particular, there is no Bayes’
formula which defines conditional probability in the Kolmogorov model. Such
a probability model we call Bellian model, since J. Bell was the first who
started to work in such a framework: measure-theoretical approach without
Bayes formula and, in fact, without any definition of conditional probability.
1.2 Bell’s inequality
Let P = (Ω,F ,P) be a Kolmogorov probability space. The Bell’s inequality
[6] can be mathematically formulated in the form of the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1. (Bell inequality for covariations) Let a, b, c = ±1 be
random variables on P. Then Bell’s inequality
| < a, b > − < c, b > | ≤ 1− < a, c > (1)
holds true.
2 Bell-Wigner inequality for conditional prob-
abilities and measurements of spin projec-
tions for a single electron
2.1 Statistical model of classical physics
Definition 2.1. Let O = {a, b, . . . c} be a system of physical observables.
This system permits the classical statistical description if there exists a Kol-
mogorov probability space P = (Ω,F ,P) such that all observables belonging to
O can be represented by random variables on P and conditional probabilities
are defined by the Bayes’ formula: P(a = α/b = β) = P(a=α,b=β)
P(b=β)
.
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Thus the possibility of the classical statistical description of some sys-
tem of physical observables is equivalent to the possibility of using the Kol-
mogorov probability model. We remark that classical statistical mechanics
permits the classical statistical description. We would like to analyze the pos-
sibility to apply the classical statistical description to quantum mechanics.
The Kolmogorov space P can be considered as a space of hidden variables.
Traditionally there is used the symbol Λ, instead of Ω.
2.2 Wigner inequality
We recall the following simple mathematical result, see Wigner [10]:
Theorem 2.1. (Wigner inequality) Let a, b, c = ±1 be arbitrary random
variables on a Kolmogorov space P. Then the following inequality holds true.
P(a = +1, b = +1) +P(b = −1, c = +1) ≥ P(a = +1, c = +1) (2)
The proof of this theorem in the purely mathematical framework can be
found e.g., in my book [11], p. 89-90.2
2.3 Wigner-type inequality for conditional probabili-
ties
As a simple consequence of Theorem 2.1, we obtain:
Theorem 2.2. (Wigner inequality for conditional probabilities). Let
a, b, c = ±1 be symmetrically distributed observables which permit the classi-
cal statistical description. Then the following inequality holds true:
P(a = +1/b = +1) +P(c = +1/b = −1) ≥ P(a = +1/c = +1) (3)
Proof. We have P(b = +1) = P(b = −1) = P(a = +1) = P(a = −1) =
P(c = +1) = P(c = −1) = 1/2. Thus
P(a = +1/b = +1) +P(c = +1/b = −1)
2The inequality (2) is, in fact, the well known version of Bell’s inequality obtained by
Wigner in 1970, see [10]. Moreover, Wigner proved this inequality in the same general
probabilistic framework as was used in Theorem 2.1 (so by using the Bellian probability
model). Then following Bell’s strategy he applied (2) to the EPR-Bohm experiment for
correlated particles. It is easy to see that (2) is violated for an appropriative choice of
pairs of spin projectors.
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= 2P(a = +1, b = +1) + 2P(c = +1, b = −1)
and P(a = +1/c = +1) = 2P(a = +1, c = +1). Hence by (2) we get (3).
We underline again that the main distinguishing feature of (3) is the pres-
ence of only conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities can always
be calculated by using quantum formalism. In fact, we need not consider
pairs of particles, since conditional probabilities are well defined even for
noncomposite quantum systems.
2.4 The impossibility of classical statistical description
of spin projections of a single electron
Suppose that the classical statistical description can be used for spin 1
2
sys-
tem. Thus all spin projections can be represented by random variables on a
single Kolmogorov space P and (in the opposite to the Bellian probability
model) conditional probabilities are given by the Bayes’ formula.
We consider a family of spin projections: σ(θ) = cos θσz + sin θσx, where
σx, σz are Pauli matrices, θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
The classical (Kolmogorovian) statistical realism implies that we can ap-
ply the inequality (3) to any three spin projectors σ(θ1), σ(θ2), σ(θ3):
P(σ(θ1) = +1/σ(θ2) = +1) +P(σ(θ3) = +1/σ(θ2) = −1) (4)
≥ P(σ(θ1) = +1/σ(θ3) = +1).
As always we can compute conditional probabilities by using quantum
formalism [12]. If we have two arbitrary dichotomous observables a and b
which can be described by QM then (see chapter 1, section 6):
P(a = αi/b = βj) = | < e
a
i , e
b
j > |
2,
where {eai } and {e
b
i} are systems of normalized eigenvectors of operators aˆ
and bˆ, respectively: aˆeai = αie
a
i , bˆe
b
j = βje
b
j . For spin projectors we have
σ(θ)ϕ+(θ) = ϕ+(θ), where ϕ+(θ) = (cos
θ
2
, sin
θ
2
)
σ(θ)ϕ
−
(θ) = −ϕ
−
(θ), where ϕ
−
(θ) = (− sin
θ
2
, cos
θ
2
)
Thus
P(σ(θ1) = +1/σ(θ2) = +1) = cos
2 θ1 − θ2
2
,
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P(σ(θ3) = +1/σ(θ2) = −1) = sin
2 θ3 − θ2
2
,
P(σ(θ1) = +1/σ(θ3) = +1) = cos
2 θ1 − θ3
2
.
By (4) we have
cos2
θ1 − θ2
2
+ sin2
θ3 − θ2
2
≥ cos2
θ1 − θ3
2
We take θ1 = 0, θ2 = 6θ, θ3 = 2θ and we get the following trigonometric
inequality:
cos2 3θ + sin2 2θ ≥ cos2 θ.
The latter inequality was applied by Wigner at the last step of his analysis
of Bell’s arguments for the EPR-Bohm experiment with correlated particles.
It is well known [] that this trigonometric inequality is violated for sufficiently
large θ.
Conclusion. A prequantum classical statistical model (Kolomogorovian
model) does not exist even for the Hilbert space of the dimension d = 2.3
3 Rules of correspondence between classical
and quantum statistical models
In the previous section we demonstrated that the classical probabilistic for-
malism (Kolmogorovian measure-theoretic model) is incompatible with the
quantum probabilistic formalism (Dirac-von Neumann complex Hilbert space
model) already in the case of noncomposite quantum systems. By using the
generalization of Wigner inequality to conditional probabilities, Theorem 2.2,
we have shown that classical conditional probabilities (defined via Bayes’ for-
mula, see section 1 of chapter 2) are incompatible with quantum conditional
probabilities (defined via Hilbert space projections of states. Personally I
3This result does not contradict to Bell’s example [6], since the conventional definition
of the classical probability model differs from that J. Bell had in mind (unfortunately, he
did not present a precise mathematical description of his classical probabilistic model).
Our definition coincides with that one which is used in classical statistical mechanics.
Thus from the probabilistic viewpoint classical statistical mechanics differs from quantum
mechanics even for ensembles of noncomposite quantum systems.
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thing that this would be the correct application of Bell-type inequalities in
quantum physics. The main mystery of quantum physics is not nonlocality
or “death of reality”, but the violation of Bayes’ rule for quantum conditional
probabilities.
In fact, the definition of quantum conditional probabilities is based on
the von Neumann projection postulate. Thus the main mystery of quantum
theory is encoded in the von Neumann projection postulate.
Unfortunately, J. Bell did not choose such a strategy from the very begin-
ning. Moreover, he did not pay attention to the problem of correspondence
between classical and quantum conditional probabilities. J. Bell chosen a
totally different startegy. He introduced into consideration a new element
namely nonlocality. However, it is clear that by demonstrating the viola-
tion of Bell-type inequalities for composite systems one could not clarify the
violation of the conditional probabilistic version of Wigner’s inequality, (3),
already for noncomposite systems.
We say a few words about the mathematical definition of realism in dis-
cussion on completeness of quantum mechanics. It is assumed that there
exists a space of hidden variables Ω representing states of individual phys-
ical systems. On this space there are defined objective physical variables,
ξ : Ω → R. Denote the space of physical variables by V (Ω) (this is some
space of real-valued functions on Ω).4 On the other hand, there is consid-
ered a space of physical observables O. In the quantum model they are
represented by self-adjoint operators. The whole HV-story is about the cor-
respondence between the space of physical variables V (Ω) and the space of
physical observables O; about the possibility to construct a map
T : V (Ω)→ O. (5)
The main problem is that still nobody knows precisely which features such a
map T should have. We recall the history of this problem. J. von Neumann
was the first who presented a list of possible features of T, see [12]. His main
postulates on the classical → quantum correspondence were:
VN1). T is one-to-one map.5
4The choice of this functional space depends on a model.
5Different physical variables induce different physical observables and any physical
observable correspond to some physical variable; so the map T is surjective: T (V (Ω)) =
O. We pay attention that the latter feature of T played the fiundamental role in von
Neumann’s considerations, [12].
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VN2). For any Borel function f : R→ R, we have T (f(ξ)) = f(T (ξ)).
VN3). T (ξ1+ξ2+...) = T (ξ1)+T (ξ2)+... for any any sequence ξk ∈ V (Ω).
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VN4). The range of values of the observable T (ξ) coincides with the range
of values of the variable ξ.
We remark that any statistical model should also contain a space of sta-
tistical states. In a prequantum statistical model statistical states are rep-
resented by measures on Ω, denote this space by Sclass(Ω); in the quantum
model – by von Neumann density operators; denote this space Squant. It was
assumed that
VN5). The correspondence
t : Sclass(Ω)→ Squant
is one-to-one.
VN6). Assume that for ξ1, ..., ξn ∈ V (Ω) the corresponding observables
T (ξ1), ..., T (ξn) can be measured simultaneously. Then the simultaneous
probability distributions of the variables ξ1, ..., ξn (with respect to a statisti-
cal state ρ ∈ Sclass(Ω)) and the observables T (ξ1), ..., T (ξn) (with respect to
a statistical state D = t(ρ) ∈ Squant) coincide.
J. von Neumann did not write anything about conditional probability.
But it should be natural to complete his system of postulates by
CP). For any pair of physical variables ξ and η and a statistical state ρ ∈
Sclass(Ω), the probability (given by the Bayes’ formula) that ξ ∈ B under the
condition η ∈ A coincides with the probability (given by the quantum formula
for conditional probability) to observe that T (ξ) ∈ B after a measurement
of T (η) on the state D = t(ρ) ∈ Squant such that T (η) ∈ A.
Here A and B are Borel subsets of the real line.
J. von Neumann proved that a correspondence T between a classical
statistical model M = (Sclass(Ω), V (Ω)) and the quantum statistical model
N = (Squant, O) satisfying the postulates VN1–VN6 does not exist. J. Bell
critisized the von Neumann postulates VN1, VN3 as unphysical (we remark
that Kochen and Specker also used the postulate VN1). He deleted VN3
6As J. von Neumann remarked: “the simulateneous measurability of T (ξ1), T (ξ2), ... is
not assumed”, see [12], p. 314.
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from the list of postulates on the correspondence between M and N and
modified VN1 in the following way:
VN1B). T maps V (Ω) onto O.7
The crucial point was that neither J. Bell nor J. von Neumann paid atten-
tion that without the postulate CP on the correspondence between classical
and quantum condition probabilities such a correspondence would look very
unnatural. In the opposite to the postulates VN1, VN3, this postulate does
not look so unphysical (especially in combination with other postulates).
One should explain why the Bayes’ formula which worked well in classical
statistical physics does not work in quantum physics. And consideration of
correlated particles could not clarify anything.
4 Connection with papers of Accardi, Aerts,
Pitowsky, Czachor
In his Email-comment to the second version of this preprint. M. Czachor paid
my attention to his paper [13] on classical models of spin which contains an
extended analysis of models of I. Pitowsky [14] and Aerts [15]. I totally agree
with conclusions of M. Czachor that “both these hidden variable models
are based on an observation that a structure of conditional probabilities
characteristic for systems with spin is not a Kolmogorovian one. The problem
is rooted in a non-Bayesian structure of such probabilities and is typically
manifested by a violation of Bell’s inequality.”
Especially interesting for us is M. Czachor’s investigation to find out
which elements of models are sufficient for the non-Kolmogorovity of de-
scription and his conclusion that “a conditioning by a change of state is,
actually, the required sufficient condition.”
I also think that both Pitowsky’s and Aerts’ models are not about simul-
taneous measurements as we have in the EPR-Bohm framework, but about
conditional measurements:
We have some state φ; perform a measurement of an observable a; the state
φ is changed; in a new post a-measurement state we perform a measurement of
another observable b which is incompatible with (or better to say complementary
to) a.
7Any quantum observable a ∈ O has a preimage (may be nonunique) in V (Ω).
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Of course, both Pitowsky’s and Aerts’ models were created in relation to
Bell’s inequality. And M. Czachor pointed out that “There is no contradiction
with the Bell Theorem, because it is impossible to derive the Bell inequality
for this model.”
I agree that it is impossible to get the ordinary Bell’s inequality, because
we cannot perform a simultaneous measurement of a and b. This obser-
vation was the starting point for the investigation presented in my paper.
Instead of Bell’s inequality for the simultaneous probability distributions, I
derived Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities. This inequality can be
applied to conditional measurements. I demonstrated that it is violated by
quantum model (as everybody could expect!). We remark that this condi-
tional probability inequality is based only on the assumption that we can
use Bayes’ formula for conditional probabilities, cf. L. Accardi [16], [17].
Since both Pitowsky’s and Aerts’ models reproduce quantum probabilities,
Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities is automatically violated for
these models.
I would like to thank L. Ballentine, P. Busch, S. Gudder, B. Coecke,
W. De Baere, W. De Muynck for discussions on the statistical structure of
quantum theory.
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